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Abstract 
 
Standard health economics concentrates on the provision of care by medical professionals.  Yet 
‘care’ receives scant analysis; it is portrayed as a spillover effect or externality in the form of 
interdependent utility functions.  In this context care can only be conceived as either acts of 
altruism or as social capital.  Both conceptions are subject to considerable problems stemming 
from mainstream health economics’ reliance on a reductionist social model built around 
instrumental rationality and consequentialism.  Subsequently, this implies a disregard for moral 
rules and duties and the compassionate aspects of behaviour.  Care as an externality is a second-
order concern relative to self-interested utility maximization, and is therefore crowded out by 
the parameters of the standard model.  We outline an alternative relational approach to 
conceptualising care based on the social embeddedness of the individual that emphasises the 
ethical properties of care.  The deontological dimension of care suggests that standard health 
economics is likely to undervalue the importance of care and caring in medicine. 
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1. Introduction 
 
As a field, mainstream or standard health economics applies neoclassical economic reasoning 
and cost-effectiveness analysis to health care.  It explains behavior as constrained utility 
maximization,  and takes a consequentialist approach to the valuation of care (see, for example, 
Forget 2004; Glied and Smith 2011).  Health care is seen as being supplied primarily by medical 
professionals (Mooney, 2009), and  since Arrow’s seminal article (1963) the care relationship 
has been explained in terms of interdependent utility functions and principal-agent relationships 
between clinicians and patients (McGuire, et al 1982), between “significant others” and patients 
(Bobinac, et al 2010), between the wider population and those who are ill (Culyer 1976), and 
in terms of dual utility functions (Wiseman, 1997; Mooney 2009).  Distributional issues enter 
in terms of the idea of merit goods (for example, Tuohy and Glied 2011).  The standard 
approach usually describes merit goods in terms of situations where the maxim of consumer 
sovereignty is relaxed – consumers are not the best judges of their own welfare and are assumed 
to usually under-consume such ‘goods’ as education and some forms of health care, such as 
inoculations. These commodities may be subsidised because they possess external benefits, 
which are unlikely to be reflected in their market price.  In short, standard health economics 
privileges the market as an institution: the market is the analytical entry point for health 
economists.  The description of much of health care as a merit good with principal-agent 
properties invites discussion of market failure and departures from what is taken to be a 
‘standard’ market.  In all this, the market retains analytical centrality.  Institutional 
arrangements in the delivery of medical care are seen as primarily correcting for market failure.  
No reference is made to the history of medicine. 
 
Care is treated as homogenous across those distinctive sets of relationships, although there is 
some recognition of differences in the intensity of care as a set of practices (Lilly, et al 2010).  
Within this framework, care can only be conceived as altruism or social capital.  In this regard, 
health economists’ understanding of care draws from Gary Becker’s (1976) work extending the 
“economic approach” to the social domain that uses standard analytical tools  to re-interpret  
interactions within the family, addiction, health, and crime in utility maximization terms (for 
example, Becker 2007; Bobinac, et al 2010; see also, Fine 1999). 
 
We believe, however, that standard health economics offers an inadequate view of care qua 
care.  We argue this is due to its being strictly rooted in the standard utility conception of the 
individual as a bundle of preferences.  This makes the individual a socially dis-embedded being 
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(Davis, 2003; 2011; Davis and McMaster 2007), and precludes  a more thorough appreciation 
and understanding of care that recognises its relational, instinctive, socially constructed, and 
deontological character.  To be fair, many health economists recognise the limitations of the 
standard utilitarian approach to care, though they have also done little to revise it.  That is what 
this paper aims to do. 
 
Care theory is a relatively recent and still contested field having interdisciplinary roots from 
feminist theory to medicine and education, and as such lacks the cohesion of more established 
domains of behavioral research.  Arguably this is in part due to the amorphous nature of care – 
it is ontologically diverse, ranging from nurturing; to offering or having affection, sympathy, 
or empathy; to listening; to having an interest; to the discharge of acts and duties associated 
with a particular role.  It is thus at once both natural and socially constructed, frequently 
gendered, and it is normatively laden.  The concept of care has accordingly received rather 
superficial attention in mainstream health economics, though it was explained in the history of 
economics in terms of sympathy and altruism by David Hume and Adam Smith, expressed as 
a key human instinct (the “parental bent”) by Thorstein Veblen, and is important in the policy 
domain as, for instance, articulated in the United Nations’ declaration on human rights.   
 
To focus the discussion, we limit the the scope of our analysis to how care is addressed in 
standard health economics, i.e., in terms of how medical care is provided by medical institutions 
and professionals, although we stress that our approach, emphasising social embeddedness, 
encompasses diverse forms of care that transcend disciplinary boundaries.  Our aim is to 
demonstrate the inadequacy of health economics in its ‘own territory’, and show that its 
approach cannot readily apprehend the diversity, nuances, and value of care and caring.  We 
emphasise that we do not attempt to establish an alternative approach to the concept of care – 
this is beyond a single paper.  Given the growing influence of health economics (Culyer and 
Newhouse, 2000; Glied and Smith 2011), indeed, especially in the context of the fiscal 
challenges authorities are endeavouring to address, we feel it is sufficiently appropriate to 
scrutinise the limitations of its conception of “care”. 
 
The remainder of the paper adopts the following structure.  In section 2, we discuss health 
economics’ conceptualisation of care as an externality.  Section 3 critically evaluates this 
standard analysis.  In section 4 we then analyse the ethical properties of care as set out in the 
influential work of Tronto (1993, 2013), noting that care’s relational dimension implies a 
socially embedded individual rather than one understood as a bundle of preferences.  Section 5 
presents our understanding of the relational nature of health-medical care, and more fully 
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explains the concept of the socially embedded individual.  The final section 6 offers thoughts 
on the implications for standard health economics’ rendering of care. 
 
 
2. Mainstream health economics: care as an externality 
 
Mainstream health economics’ entry point for its analysis of care is the delivery of professional 
medical services  to individual patients.  Thus, medical care is at one level analogous to the 
transaction for any good or service, subject to information asymmetries in a patient-physician 
principal-agent  relationship (Mooney and Ryan, 1993).  Yet standard health economics 
acknowledges a potential contradiction between a physician’s self-interest via demand 
inducement (for example, McGuire, 2000; 2011) and acting in ways that promote the patient’s 
welfare (see, for example, Rice, 2001; J Williams, 2012).  Indeed, Alan Williams (1988) argued 
that the patient-physician relation is a “perfect” agency relationship.  Then what constrains the 
physician from inducing demand for their services, or lowering their quality?  This tension 
requires the standard health economics explain care as an externality (see references to this in, 
for example, Bobinac, et al, 2010; Culyer, 1976; McGuire, et al, 1982), or as an unintended 
spillover effect of production or consumption not reflected in the price of the activity, i.e. as a 
market failure.  There are two overlappingways in which this has been explained: care as 
altruism and care as social capital. 
 
 
2.1 Care as altruism: interdependent utility functions 
 
Since Arrow’s (1963) article on the economic features of medical care, medical ethics has been 
acknowledged in standard health economics as means of tempering “consumer exploitation” 
arising from information asymmetries in the supply of health care.  The most prominent 
interpretation treats medical ethics as both an assurance and insurance against moral hazard 
associated with behaviour by the agent-physician that is self-interested and misaligned to and 
damaging to the interests of the principal-patient.  It also moderates the potential for adverse 
selection, which reflects the information asymmetry between buyers (patients) and sellers 
(physicians) that implies caveat emptor (see Mooney and Ryan, 1993; A. Williams, 1988).  
McGuire (2000, 521) argues: 
 
“An ‘ethic’ has the flavor of a dictate or a constraint – once the constraint is binding, 
other objectives of the physician become irrelevant.  Perhaps for this reason, most 
papers in health economics do not use a constraint to represent ethics, but instead 
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represent physician concern for patients with a utility function including as an argument 
something valued by the patient … or the patient’s utility itself.  In this construction, 
the physician’s ethically driven concern for patients is subject to being traded off 
against self-interest” (emphasis added). 
 
McGuire is explicit that the physician utility function consists of net income accruing to the 
clinician and the benefits/utility received by the patient.  Standard microeconomic accounts of 
altruism view the benefits accruing to another as an argument in the individual’s utility function 
as a special type of preference having the form: agent X’s preference for satisfying agent Y’s 
preferences (Folbre and Goodin, 2004).  As Khalil (2003: 116) expresses it, the altruist (qua 
charity) lowers “his interest in order to buttress the recipient’s interest”.  Yet there is a tension 
here.  Mainstream economics assumes that scarcity is ubiquitous.  Famously Arrow (1972) in 
his critique of Richard Titmuss’ (1971) study of altruistic blood donation used the conventional 
scarcity assumption to argue that a heavy reliance on altruism – or other similar sentiments – 
in the supply of a good or service, would deplete the “resource”.  Under Arrow’s formulation 
the price mechanism remains the dominant force as it rations scarce commodities and resources 
efficiently without diminishing altruism.  Therefore, altruism, according to Arrow, should be 
confined to those practices and instances where the price mechanism “breaks down”. 
 
The standard framework, in fact, can be seen as distinguishing three approaches to altruism: 
“egoistic”, where altruism revolves around the expectation of future benefits accruing to the 
benefactor; “egocentric” (which resonates with Becker’s approach) where the donor’s utility 
reflects the utility of beneficiaries; and “altercentric” where altruistic actions are associated 
with a personality trait (Khalil, 2003). 
 
Health economic accounts of “humanitarian spillovers” between the wider population and those 
who are ill (Culyer, 1976), or care interventions as “spillovers” on “significant others” 
(Bobanic, et al, 2010) correspond to the Becker-inspired “egocentric” orientation.  A “caring 
externality” in the representative agent’s utility function generates a benefit flow to this agent 
(Mooney and Ryan, 1993) from the knowledge that other members of the population have the 
ability to access health care regardless of their ability to pay.   
 
A variation on the foregoing is presented by Wiseman (1997), who associates process utility 
with care in arguing that utility may be derived from the act of caring or giving, as well as the 
consequences of care-giving.  Drawing from Margolis’ (1982) fair shares model, Wiseman 
notes that individuals may be conceived as possessing two utility functions: one deriving from 
“selfish utility” and the other from group or social activities.  In recommending this approach, 
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Mooney (2009) invokes Sen’s (1977) reference to “commitment” in articulating the idea of a 
social welfare function “independent” of an individual’s utility functions, so that the social 
welfare function is no longer simply the aggregation of individual utility functions.  This dual 
utility function approach may be viewed as a heuristic device to account for how seemingly 
irrational acts, seen from a strictly selfish perspective – such as altruistic care giving at personal 
cost – can be explained as rational acts consistent with utility derived socially.  This contrasts 
with other analyses where the process of care-giving is modelled as burdensome (Bobanic, et 
al, 2010). 
 
In effect, two interpretations are offered: care as an argument in the physician utility function 
and care as a component in a separate “collective” or “social welfare function”.  Mooney and 
Wiseman associate the latter with commitment, and say it thereby goes beyond the standard 
case, which they believe can only accommodate “sympathy” in the form of interdependent 
functions (Mooney, 2009: 22).  Mooney also argues that health economists have “ignored” the 
contextual element of caring: caring that takes place in a community, which bears some 
resonance with a process perspective, and thereby identifies a potential distinction between 
processes and outcomes of care.  We agree with Mooney’s assessment and commend his 
emphasis.  At the same time, however, we feel the dual utility function approach does not 
capture all the relevant dimensions of care, as we argue below.  Moreover, in the dual utility 
case it remains theoretically plausible for a meta-function to serve as the appropriate maximand 
with all the resulting trade-offs (see also Brennan’s 1993 critique).  Further, the dual function 
approach does not depart from the standard frame in its exclusive reliance on consequentialist 
reasoning.  Care is a form of other-regarding behaviour, but limitedly so.  As the quotation from 
McGuire above makes explicit, arguments (or utility functions) in the individual’s (meta) utility 
function may be traded off against one another. 
 
 
2.2 Care as social capital 
 
The health economics literature consistently refers to health care as a “special commodity” (see 
for example, Becker, 2007; Culyer and Newhouse, 2000; Jones, et al, 2006, and McGuire, et 
al, 1982, see also, Mooney’s, 2009, advocacy of a “community” health care commodity).  
Indeed, in echoes of Culyer’s (1976) “humanitarian spillovers” idea, Tuohy and Glied (2011) 
discuss the distribution of health care in terms of its status as a merit good.  Governments then 
intervene to ensure certain levels of minimum health care for those on lower incomes by 
constraining the health care choices of those on higher incomes through the redistribution of 
resources.  Tuohy and Glied’s analysis and others like it do not explicitly attempt to analyse 
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conceptions of care; instead they are focused on the distribution of (medical) care resources 
(see also J Williams’, 2012, study of geographical variations in medical care utilization). 
 
Treating care as an externality makes it as an aspect of social capital, since most contributions 
to this approach define social capital in terms of non-rivalrous public goods (Folland, 2006) or 
overtly as an externality (Portes, 1998).  The social capital literature supposes that caring social 
relationships have powerful beneficial effects on health.  A considerable literature also 
recognizes the potential for the indirect effects of social capital on health through its 
associations with politico-economic and environmental variables that influence health, such as 
access to resources (for example, Dahl and Malmberg-Heimonen, 2010). 
 
Although they do not refer explicitly to social capital, Bobinac et al’s (2010) model of informal 
care is informative in that it seeks to expand health economics beyond its principal focus on the 
physician-as-carer by using the standard externality account.  Those close to an ill individual 
benefit from improvements to this individual’s health status by virtue of their relationship to 
that individual – “the significant other(s)”.  In contrast, Bobinac et al’s “caregiver effect” refers 
to the welfare effects of providing care as a set of activities.  Their hypothesis reflects the 
standard assumption of the disutility of work in that the greater the caregiving activities 
involved the greater the adverse impact of the care provider’s welfare, through for instance, 
emotional stress and opportunity costs in time commitment.  The authors claim the two effects 
are difficult to disentangle as informal care tends to be provided by a common unit – the family. 
 
Bobinac et al also argue that the family effect of informal care offers an important insight: care 
provision has welfare effects beyond the care provider–recipient relationship, and therefore that 
their research ultimately shows: “patients should not be seen as isolated individuals” (Bobinac 
et al, 2010: 555).  Again, such claims have some correspondence to Culyer’s “humanitarian 
spillovers”, and they also represent the social dimension of care in interdependent utility 
function terms.  We agree with Bobinac et al’s advocacy: the patient should not be viewed as 
an isolated individual.  Indeed, their allusion to the social hints at relations nested in further 
relations, and thus departs from the standard view of social capital as a “plausible” economic 
concept when it is reformulated at the individual level (Folland, 2006).  Nonetheless, Bobanic, 
et al and Folland share their analytical grounding in Becker’s individualist model of altruism 
within the family. 
 
 
3. Problems: an inadequate treatment of care? 
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Care, we believe, has not been explained adequately in the mainstream health economics 
framework, because the interaction between the individual patient and clinician has been 
framed as one solely between individuals who are instrumentally rational utility maximizers.  
This is also the case in those models that seek to account for welfare beyond the physician-
patient relation (for example, Bobinac, et al, 2010; Burge, et al, 2010; Lilly, et al, 2010). 
 
We do not deny that individuals in many walks of life are instrumentally rational.  We do deny 
that this form of behaviour fully describes patient-clinician relationships.   We also believe that 
restricting the analysis and policy thinking regarding health care institutions to populations of 
instrumentally rational utility maximizers can produce institutional accommodations that are 
inimical to improving patients’ health. For example, the instrumental rationality framing of care 
encourages clinics and hospitals to measure care as a set of well-defined, standardized 
procedures that produce determinate outcomes, while crowding out the less tangible and less 
measurable therapeutic, compassionate, and deontological dimensions of care Our general view 
is that how health care is provided to people fundamentally depends on how health care 
institutions are designed, and we believe they can be designed to emphasize the aspects of care 
neglected in standard health economics. 
 
 
3.1 Care as altruism 
 
The orthodox economic analysis of altruism has been heavily criticised, and by extension much 
of this criticism may be applied to health economics’ view of care as altruism.  In Khalil’s 
(2003) egocentric account of altruism, altruists favour health care on account of its expected 
benefits to them.  However, Khalil argues, altruism thus understood has a paradoxical quality 
in that it can be equivalent to masochism as the altruist gains more the more wretched the state 
of the parties receiving care.  This is logically consistent with Culyer’s idea of “humanitarian 
spillover” and the interdependence of clinician-patient utility functions.  Nonetheless, it seems 
hardly humanitarian or caring in a positive sense that others’ misery sustains a vicarious sort of 
utility for the altruistic/caring agent.  More specifically, in extremis, under this conception 
medical cures are the last thing physicians want: therapeutic treatments are ruled out, and 
medical procedures are reduced to some form of intermittent palliative episodes of “care” 
followed by periods of tolerating the patient’s worsening medical condition (a source of 
disutility), to be followed by the patient’s improvement as a consequence of further episodes of 
palliative “care” (a source of utility), and so on.  Thus, a process of infinite regress is entered 
as Khalil’s masochist mutates into a sadomasochist with a stethoscope.  Obviously Arrow’s 
“medical ethics” constrains a physician’s toleration of a patient’s deteriorating condition, but 
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it is only a constraint: the logic of the mainstream conception of vicarious utility implies the 
physician is motivated to behave in the manner outlined above. 
 
Moreover, the idea of a ‘caring externality’ is problematic in itself in that the spillover is not 
on a third-party, as in the standard case, but actually on one of the parties to the exchange, 
namely, the patient.  If we say then, that care providers gain utility when their patients gain 
utility, does their care for those individuals constitute something over and above the health care 
services being delivered?  Caring externalities might then be thought to counterbalance the 
negative effects of moral hazard in that the incentives that asymmetric information creates for 
physicians to pursue individual gain, such as supplier-induced demand, or the sadomasochist 
case, above, could be offset by the special regard for the well-being of the patient that comes 
from this caring preference. 
 
However, this will not work, since on the standard view caring defined as an externality still 
acts as a secondary, non-essential type of factor since health care is delivered whether or not 
physicians exhibit caring preferences.  In contrast, physicians are clearly incentivized  to induce 
patient demand.  Thus there should generally be a tendency for caring attitudes, such as 
compassion, and hence related activities, such as therapeutic care, to be crowded out, or at least 
become peripheral.  Ethical motives, as it were, are always at risk when economic ones 
dominate.  This conclusion is reinforced by the standard view in microeconomics that 
externalities are only addressed through the intervention of government in the market system.  
In the case of clinician caring preferences, this implies that unless government or some other 
institutional authority (medical associations, codes of ethics, etc.) weighs in on the side of 
patients, one should expect caring preferences to be continually under pressure to be crowded 
out of medical care markets. 
 
The view of care as altruism is subject to a further problem: how does the altruist know what 
another agent’s preferences are, especially assuming the standard view that preferences are 
understood to be revealed preferences?  Drawing from Bourdieu (1977), Dewey (1922) and 
Veblen (1994 [1899]), altruism, we suggest, is more appropriately seen as a disposition, in 
effect a habit, in that it is more suitably conceptualised as a cause of an individual’s actions and 
practices than a consequence.  Habit, moreover, can be either dynamically reinforced or 
weakened through changes in institutional patterns of social interaction.   
 
As Folbre and Goodin (2004 19) argue, the standard account gives: 
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 “No sense of the way in which professional roles (such as those of a doctor or nurse or 
teacher) are practised and perfected … if we were to think purely in terms of specific 
freestanding preferences and episodic choices emanating from them: we need to think 
instead in terms of the training and honing of underlying dispositions to act in ways 
consonant with those roles …”. 
 
This contrasts markedly to Arrow’s (1972) scarcity of altruism analysis.  If the supply of 
altruism is limited, as Arrow argues, then there is a case for economizing on it.  However, as 
Singer (1973) argued in his critique of Arrow, such a position conflates altruism and other 
similar virtues and dispositions to those properties associated with conventional economic 
goods.  This, as Sandel (2012, 128) maintains, 
 
“Ignores the possibility that our capacity for love and benevolence is not depleted with 
use but enlarged with practice”. 
 
What we take from this is that treating “care” as a preference in an agent’s utility function 
makes the level of care something determined through an algorithm of utility maximisation.  
But this framing makes care a highly mechanical affair, and imposes an instrumentalist 
interpretation on the concept of care.  This in turn suggests the body might be understood as a 
machine, and that ethical values, particularly non-consequentialist deontological ones, have no 
place in the analysis of care.  Following the philosopher Bernard Williams (1985), we say that 
instrumentalism removes care from the realm of ethical consideration.  For Williams, the 
outcomes of actions certainly warrant classification as ethical considerations, but so to do 
obligations and duties, as do character dispositions (virtues), given that they affect how 
individuals deliberate in undertaking or avoiding actions of certain types.  Williams’ arguments 
stress deontological value and the social embeddedness of the individual.  In contrast, a health 
economics based on socially dis-embedded individuals imparts, at best, a thin notion of care.  
Yet it is well recognised in various literatures that therapeutic care, for example, can provide 
beneficial health outcomes (Adams and Nelson, 2009; Armstrong et al, 2008; Kontos and 
Naglie, 2009; Watson and Smith, 2002). 
 
 
3.2 Care as social capital 
 
As noted, health economists consider health care a “special” type of commodity – one 
exhibiting external benefits.  We believe there are sufficient grounds for saying that health 
economists do not appreciate the implications of this narrative.  Commodities are things that 
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are tradable, therefore monetizable, produced for sale in a market, and therefore where property 
rights may be identified and transferred (Fine 2001; McMaster 2013).  Culyer (1990) is one of 
the few health economists to seriously reflect on this conceptualisation of health care.  He 
describes commodities as: 
 
“Goods and services in the everyday sense, whose demand and supply, and whose 
growth, have been the focus of economists’ attention, and whose personal distribution 
has been the traditional focus of all social scientists having an interest in distributive 
justice” (1990: 10). 
 
This is appealing, but Culyer goes on to compare the “characteristics” of health care; timeliness, 
clinical efficacy, and readmission rates, with those of a steak; juiciness, tenderness, and flavour.  
The implication is that care is solely instrumental in producing its special characteristics, and 
that the social relations and institutional arrangements involved in health care provision are 
essentially the same as those governing commodity exchanges, including those involving 
principal-agent relations.  In the extreme, this would seem to suggest that the nature of 
dependency, as typified by the principal-agent relationship, is reducible to one of the 
distribution of information between two parties.  Regrettably, Culyer’s allusion betrays a 
reductionism that cannot acknowledge let alone analyse the relational qualities of care. 
 
By contrast, much of the care literature emphasises that care and caring are interactive, and 
hence possess profoundly relational characteristics (Engster, 2005; Mol, 2006; Tronto, 2013).  
In an economics context Himmelweit (2007: 585) expresses an important implication of the 
relational dimension of care in a compelling manner: 
 
“Caring because it is the development of a relationship, is manifestly an activity … in 
which the output is the care itself … This means that it is hard to raise the productivity 
of caring”. 
 
In articulating this, Himmelweit draws on Baumol and Bowen’s (1965) analysis of the 
economics of the arts.  They argue that productivity rises more quickly in areas of the economy 
which benefit directly from innovation, investment and/or technological enhancements.  
However, the arts, according to Baumol and Bowen, cannot benefit from these effects.  They 
use the example of a string quartet – reducing the number of players or demanding that the 
musicians play more quickly, inter alia, may raise productivity in terms of the number of pieces 
performed per musician over a given period of time, but would substantially alter the nature of 
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the piece.  The problem arises from the attempted objectification of the arts.  The same can be 
said about the nature of care. 
 
In the context of nursing and gender, Adams and Nelson (2009) similarly note that many 
desirable activities focused on therapeutic care are necessarily time costly and attempts to 
impose codified, standardised procedures are likely to diminish important aspects of caring, 
such as in the development of relations that potentially elicit more effective diagnoses (see also, 
Armstrong, et al, 2008; Groopman, 2007; van Staveren, 2001).  This is consistent with Kontis 
and Naglie’s (2009) argument that caring does not develop through theoretical learning, and 
involves experience (tacit knowledge) and “embodied selfhood”, i.e. a synthesis of primordial 
and social being.  In short, medical, and other forms of care cannot be captured adequately by 
appealing to the characteristics of a steak. 
 
 
4. Towards a richer conceptualisation of care 
 
Care, as we have noted, possesses an amorphous quality – it is ontologically diverse: it is at 
once natural (Churchland 2011) and socially constructed and thusnormatively laden (Baier 
1982; Engster 2005).  Given this, as Tronto (2013) recognises, care has many meanings – it can 
denote a burden, it expresses a disposition or action, and is relational, although this is not 
restricted to human interactions, it extends to objects, ‘things’.  Indeed, we feel that this is the 
overriding consensus that emerges from the disparate roots of care theorising – from feminist 
theory to medicine and nursing, education, philosophy, and sociology, for instance (Baier, 
1982; Blustein, 1991; Churchland 2011; Engster 2005; Folbre 1995; Folbre and Nelson 2000; 
Mol 2006; Noddings 2003; Tronto 1993, 2013; van Staveren 2001, 2005; Watson 2008).  For 
us, in order to capture care, the sociality and hence social embeddedness of individuals has to 
be acknowledged.  This has profound implications for standard health economics, which we 
outline in the following sections. 
 
An influential definition of care comes from Fisher and Tronto (1990): 
 
“On the most general level, we suggest that caring be viewed as a species activity that 
includes everything that we do to maintain, continue, and repair our ‘world’ so that we 
can live in it as well as possible.  That world includes our bodies, or selves, and our 
environment, all of which we seek to interweave in a complex, life-sustaining web” 
(cited in Tronto 1993 103; 2013 19, original emphasis). 
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Within this “complex web” of care there is an evocation of power, vulnerability and 
dependence, which carries implications for individual autonomy and capabilities, and the 
practices of care within institutional settings.  Tronto (2013) has defended the level of generality 
of her definition of the grounds that it is an attempt to provide an over-arching frame from 
which the manifestations of care and caring may be aligned with particular ethical properties.  
Thus, the breadth of her definition informs and shapes Tronto’s emphasis on care as a series of 
purposeful activities, which may be further deconstructed as follows. 
 
Tronto (2013) identifies five specific phases of care: care-about – there is some recognition of 
a need for care; caring-for – where responsibility for addressing these needs is established; 
care-giving – is the delivery of the caring activities; care-receiving – following the delivery of 
the care activity there is some response from the entity in receipt of care.  Following this, a 
judgement has to be made as to the extent to which care needs have been addressed.  The fifth 
phase is caring with, which Tronto argues refers to the alignment of caring needs and how they 
are addressed with democratic commitments to justice, equality and freedom. 
 
These phases of care may be fraught with conflict, given that the need for care is likely to 
outweigh the ability to deliver care (Engster, 2005; Smith, 1998; Tronto, 2013).  For instance, 
it is well recognised that care may be contingent in that there is a strong inclination for care-for 
and care-giving to those in closest proximity.  Churchland (2011), for example, considers this 
in terms of the neurobiology of animals (particularly mammals) suggesting that self-care is part 
of a survival instinct, which also reaches near kin as an extension of the self.  Again, 
Churchland’s analysis indicates the significance of the relational aspect of caring.  Smith (1998) 
notes the tensions between spatiality and human similarity in caring.  Smith historically situates 
the issue of spatial differentiation in caring intensity, noting that interdependence and ease of 
communication are very recent phenomena in human history.  Prior to this the prevalence of 
small-scale societies restricted the treatment of strangers to certain short-term “codes of 
hospitality” (Smith, 1998 17).  Thus, a lack of familiarity can impede the translation of 
benevolence, as the desire to do good, into beneficence, as doing good.  Similarly, Tronto’s 
phases of care may breakdown between care-about and care-giving, by, for instance, the 
absence of establishing caring-for. 
 
The phases of care may be aligned with particular (overlapping) moral qualities, or virtues 
(Engster 2005; Tronto 1993, 2013; see also Mol 2006; Noddings 2003).  The first phase of care 
– caring-about – requires the virtue of attentiveness.  This implies some sensitivity to situations 
where caring needs may arise, and therefore demonstrates some degree of empathy (Engster 
 14 
2005) and perhaps benevolence – the desire to do good (Smith 1998).  Without attentiveness it 
is unlikely that care-giving, if it occurs, will be effective in addressing caring needs.  
Attentiveness may be apprehended as a moral obligation by virtue of a social role that entails 
certain responsibilities.  Thus, under Tronto’s phases of care, caring-for specifically embodies 
responsibilities for addressing recognised care needs.  In other words, there is an obligation.  
For Tronto this further suggests an additional moral quality – competence in the delivery or 
administration of caring actions.  She argues: “To be competent to care, given one’s caring 
responsibilities, is not simply a technical issue, but a moral one” (Tronto 2013, 35). 
 
A further virtue is responsiveness, which implies a dialogue between care-provider and receiver 
to identify the nature of caring needs and whether they have been addressed.  Noddings (2003), 
in particular, emphasises this in terms of sympathy.  She refers to the Western aid programme 
following a devastating earthquake in Afghanistan in the 1990s in which food and clothing 
were donated, but building materials were required, yet not donated, as a clear example of a 
lack of responsiveness (and sympathy) and hence, at best, superficial care.  Indeed, Blustein’s 
(1991) allusion to the pivotal role of commitment in care further resonates.  Commitment 
framed in terms of a disposition or dedication to something or someone implies responsiveness.  
However, if a commitment is superficial or perfunctory then dispositions may not be readily 
translated into particular caring actions. 
 
The literature further refers to respect as a virtue of caring.  For Engster (2005) this revolves 
around the notion that others are worthy of recognition, attention, and responsiveness.  In the 
case of humans respect infers that others should not be treated in a way that is degrading, and 
should acknowledge their abilities by virtue of their humanity.  In other words, an individual’s 
dignity should be ensured.  The emphasis is similar to Smith’s argument noted earlier, and 
further corresponds to Entwistle and Watt’s (2013) advocacy of capabilities in health care.  In 
this regard, the authors articulate a case for a person-centred (or “person-al” as they term it) 
approach to delivering medical care founded on the principles of respect and compassion, 
responsiveness to patients’ subjective experiences, and support for capabilities for (patient) 
autonomy.  We believe in fact that an increasing number of health economists and physicians 
have begun to think in terms of capabilities and person-centered care in connection with their 
attention to patient-centered outcomes in clinical practice. 
 
From our perspective, the foregoing suggests an overarching caring virtue may be embodied 
by compassion.  In medical care compassion is seen as a traditional attribute conveyed by the 
Hippocratic ethos (for example, Aasland 2001; Armstrong et al 2008; Groopman 2007; 
Pellegrino 2006).  Compassion is viewed both as a disposition or appreciation of the condition 
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of others, and of actively alleviating their adverse condition.  Indeed, the Latin etymology is 
“co-suffering”.  On this understanding compassion in health care not only embraces 
attentiveness and responsibility, but also active treatment (or giving of care) – the physician 
comprehends the suffering of the patient (Cassell 1985).  Of course, there are perennial 
concerns that medical professionals do not always or consistently demonstrate compassion in 
the discharge of their duties.  Aasland (2001), for instance, expresses concern about the 
(institutional) crowding out of compassion in contemporary medical practice, and Groopman 
(2007) conveys similar disquiet on the basis of physicians’ frequent lack of responsiveness to 
patients.  This further reveals the incongruities of care.  For instance, Folbre (1995) refers to 
the scenario of an ill-humoured nurse providing better, or more appropriate medical care than 
a loving parent.  Following Noddings (2003) such a scenario suggests an absence of caring due 
to the lack of sympathy expressed – the nurse has not given care in a caring way.  Indeed, this 
seems to question framing care in instrumental (and consequentialist) terms, and reiterates that 
actions of themselves warrant ethical consideration (B Williams 1985). 
 
Moreover, the foregoing also relates to distinctions between altruism and compassion.  As 
noted, an important element of the standard health economic conceptualisation of care is 
consistent with altruism.  Altruism, like compassion is other-regarding.  However, altruism is 
individualistic in that it does not invoke a moral obligation associated with a particular social 
role – there is no sense of duty or responsibility.  Accordingly, there may be an ephemeral 
property to altruism that may be subject to instrumental calculations, as in Arrow’s (1972) 
critique of Titmuss and Khalil’s (2003) analysis, and therefore less socially embedded than 
compassion. 
 
Given the foregoing, care then is associated with compassion, drawing from the virtues of 
caring noted.  However, as care is also, to some extent socially constructed in that it is conceived 
and developed in particular institutions, such as Western medical education.  There are 
obligations, responsibilities, and duties to care arising from an individual’s social position.  
Care need not be altruistic or necessarily imbued in altruistic acts.  Thus, care does not only 
refer to series of functional practices or acts, but is imbued with ethical qualities; this is 
particularly the case in medical care (Sulmasy 1993; Pellegrino 2006).  For Engster (2005), the 
responsibilities and obligations of caring, in general, are to be founded on our common 
dependency – at various times in our lives we will be dependent on others for our well-being, 
and therefore when in a position to be able to offer care we are obligated to do so.  In medical 
care there is an obvious duty on clinical professionals to offer care on the basis of their social 
position. 
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5. The relational nature of health-medical care and the socially embedded individual 
 
The medical literature is replete with references to the relational dimension of care (for 
example, Aasland, 2001; Entwistle and Watt, 2013; Groopman, 2007; Pellegrino 2006; 
Sulmasy, 1993; Watson and Smith, 2002).  Given this, we believe that patients and clinicians 
should be regarded as socially embedded individuals where this reflects their membership in 
patient social groups (family and community) and clinician social groups (professional 
associations), which are jointly responsible for individuals’ care.  These two social groups are 
in turn nested in various other social relationships and interact with other social groups 
indirectly connected to the patient-clinician relationship.  Social groups are defined as 
collections of individuals with shared characteristics that specify membership in those groups, 
which creates sets of rights and responsibilities that are supported by individuals’ collective 
intentions (Davis, 2003; 2011).  By contrast, institutions may be viewed as durable systems of 
embedded and established social rules that structure social interactions around groups, and 
which are manifest in enabling and constraining behaviour, and in partly constituting the 
individual (Hodgson, 2008).  Finally, health care systems are taken to be networks of 
institutions built up around the interaction between these social groups involved in patient-
clinician relationships. 
 
Thus, our framework explains the provisioning of care socially through how many individuals 
as members of many social groups interact both directly and indirectly in the social provision 
of care.  Markets indeed operate for health care, but do so in community and national networks 
structured around social groups.  Central to this view is the idea that care thus understood is not 
between instrumentally rational atomistic individuals linked through (clinician) externalities, 
but between socially linked individuals for whom it is rational to act on shared goals.   
 
One way in which this social interaction between individuals can be understood is in terms of 
their expression of shared, or ‘we’ intentions both within groups and between groups.  Shared 
intentions provide the basis for reciprocal obligations, as when clinicians and patients commit 
to courses of treatment as a package of care to which they have agreed.  These mutual 
obligations are rational in virtue of individuals freely binding themselves by them when in 
interaction they come to the point of expressing shared intentions as the outcome of their 
deliberation over the course of care (Davis and McMaster, 2007; Entwistle and Watt, 2013, see 
also Mol, 2006).  Thus, their rational character does not derive from the particular ends they 
promote – a consequentialist view – but from the individuals’ shared commitment regarding 
care – a deontological view.  In effect, the constraints which shared intentions produce are 
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‘internal’ to the clinician-patient relationship, rather than ‘external’ to the two atomistic 
individuals’ interdependent utility functions in the standard analysis.  In this way, a person-
centred caring regime, where the individual matters, seems to us to be promoted by this type of 
approach. 
 
The simple difference between first person singular, or ‘I’ intentions, and first person plural, 
or ‘we’ intentions individually expressed points to fundamental differences in individual 
behaviour.  With the former, atomistic individuals express intentions that apply only to 
themselves and their choices are instrumental to maximizing individual utility – there is no 
social or impersonal referent.  With the latter, individuals express intentions that apply to 
themselves via the relations they have to others (see also, Entwistle and Watt, 2013, and their 
references to “person-al capabilities”).  Care relationships between patients and clinicians are 
thus socially embedding, because patients and clinicians share intentions which they implicitly 
or explicitly represent in ‘we’ language.  This is even the case in circumstances where a patient 
is incapable of decision-making, such as in comatose or related conditions, as then individuals 
from the patient’s social group (family or friends) stand in on behalf of the patient in virtue of 
their shared intentions.  Thus, pace Wiseman and Mooney, a more appropriate model for 
explaining care is, in our view, based on a deontological rather than an instrumental rationality.  
Care has important unconditional, non-instrumental qualities.1 
 
 
6. Conclusion: implications for standard health economics and its representation of 
care 
 
Our examination of the standard health economics approach to conceptualising and modelling 
care and caring relations reveals, we feel, several important issues, which suggest that further 
scrutiny of care, health and economics is entirely appropriate, especially in an era when health 
economics is being actively pursued to inform rationing and resource allocation decisions.  Our 
intention has been to investigate and establish how care is conceived in the standard approach 
and to identify underlying ethical issues.  Mainstream health economics in conceiving care as 
an externality where economic actors’ utilities are interdependent presents, as we have 
attempted to argue, a rather reductionist analysis: care is either altruism, or a “special 
commodity” redolent of social capital.  That neither is entirely well specified in the little 
literature that attempts to develop this perhaps further emphasises the peripheral nature of care 
and caring in the standard account.  Moreover, the vulnerability of care to crowding-out from 
within the parameters of the model suggests an inadequate conceptualisation.  Indeed, not only 
is this inadequate it also implies that the framework is incapable of furnishing one. 
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The reductionist and consequentialist characteristics of health economics also present a 
particular ethical architecture.  Care cannot be valued in its own right, only for the measurable 
results it produces.  For us, this infers an overly instrumental and functionalist approach, where 
care activities are reduced to a series of mechanical tasks that relegate individual circumstances.  
As has been argued previously, health economics effectively crowds out the patient as an 
individual (Davis and McMaster 2007).  Care and caring as obligations cannot be 
accommodated by the standard approach.  Culyer (1990), unwittingly perhaps, gives the game 
away when he contrasts the characteristics of care in medicine as analogous to those of a steak. 
 
Indeed, the reductionist tenor of the standard health economics approach points to a chronic 
undervaluation of care and caring.  Accordingly, policy informed by this approach is likely to 
concentrate resources on measurable standardised procedures and outcomes, which shapes 
institutional arrangements, such as medical education that may reinforce and reproduce such 
an undervaluation.  Caring about (health) care then becomes peripheral.  The standard health 
economics framing of care divorces it from its deontological dimension, and thereby weakens 
the rationale for medicine as a normative endeavour.  Indeed, we are left with the unfortunate 
conclusion that mainstream health economics cannot furnish an account for the appearance of 
care – only its disappearance. 
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Notes 
1  The distribution of power in medical relationships has been the subject of extensive discussion (see 
for example, Heritage and Maynard, 2006; Karnieli-Miller and Eisikovits, 2009; Groopman, 2007).  We 
also recognise shared intentions do not always pertain – patients may defy physician advice, refuse 
treatment, and even where intentions are shared outcomes may diverge from intent due to errors and 
practices (see for example, Cramer, 2011).  Given space limitations, we leave aside issues of power. 
 
                                                 
